Abstract: In order to keep the confidential data in the cloud
Introduction
Cloud computing, as one of the most exciting fields of technology, denotes an architectural shift towards thin clients and scalable centralized provision of computing and storage resources on-demand. However, to allow the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) take care of confidential corporate data will certainly raise the underlying security and privacy. For instance, an untrustworthy CSP may sell the confidential information about an enterprise to its closest business competitors for making a profit. Therefore, a natural way to keep sensitive data confidential against an untrusted CSP, is to store only the encrypted data in the cloud.
We propose a control solution based on CP-ABE and IBS scheme, achieving fine-grained cryptographic access, and then prove its security under the random oracle model. Meanwhile, the communication costs and the computation costs of our scheme should be low enough, so that the users can successfully retrieve data from the cloud, and then decrypt it by the thin client. Based on our previous work for ABE system under the standard model [1] , we continue to study the simplified solution of the fine-grained access control without revocation under the random oracle model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We begin with a discussion of the related work in Section 2, and present some preliminaries in Section 3. Then we outline the efficient construction based on a private cloud for our scheme in Section 4. Next, we provide the security and performance analysis respectively, in Section 5. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6.
2. Related work 2.1. Identity-based encryption S h a m i r [2] proposed the identity-based encryption and integer factoring difficulty-based signature scheme, which was a novel efficient and secure encryption and signature scheme. In IBE system, the user's public key can be any unique string, such as name, address, identity card number or other standard mark, and the private key is preserved and generated by a trusted PKG. In 2001 B o n e h and F r a n k l i n [3] constructed a bilinear map on the elliptic curve, and then S e l v i et al. [4, 5] presented several encryption schemes from bilinear pairings. In a recent work, G e n t r y and H a l e v i [6] proposed a fully secure HIBE scheme by using identity-based broadcast encryption with key randomization, and W a t e r s [7] achieved full security in systems under a simple assumption by using a dual system encryption. B o y e n [8] proposed an identity-based signature and encryption scheme, the basic idea utilized two-tier design, IBE and IBS combined in a safe manner, which makes its effectiveness and security greater than the independent IBE or IBS. With advantages, such as security, compactness, availability and realizability, Xavier's idea inspired us to consider implicating this method in cloud computing networks.
Attribute-based encryption
In a recent work C h a s e [9] provided a construction for a multi-authority ABE system, where each authority would administer a different domain of attributes. C h a s e and C h o w [10] provided a more practice-oriented multi-authority ABE system, which removes the trusted central authority while preserving user privacy. Reference [11] proposed an attribute-based signature (ABS, attribute-based signature), using a matrix with the properties of bilinear pairing and the structure of the monotone Boolean function, which has the advantage of being able to resist the collusion attack. Reference [12] proposed an attribute-based group signature method. Among others, Y u et al. [13] exploited and uniquely combined techniques of ABE, Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) [14] , and Lazy Re-Encryption (LRE) [15] to delegate most of the computation tasks involved in user revocation to untrusted CSPs without disclosing the underlying data contents, which might make a KP-ABE system more applicable in a cloud environment. Since each file is associated with an access control rather than a set of attributes as KP-ABE, it is harder to delegate the re-encryption operation to a third party. Then W a n g et al. [16, 17] and Y u et al. [18] 
. { , , , } n P P P P = be the set of the participants, an access structure A on P is a set of some subsets of P , that is In this article, the attributes are assumed to be participants, so the rows of the matrix will be marked by attributes.
Access tree
Let T represents an access structure tree, each non-tree leaf node represents a threshold, which is described by the threshold value and its child nodes. Each leaf node in the tree is described by an attribute and a threshold value
parent(x) is the parent of node x. When the node is a leaf node x , the function att(x) represents the attribute linked with the tree leaf node x. The access tree T determines each node's number from 1 to n. The function inder(x) returns the number linked with the nodes x . In any way for the given secret key, inder(x) value of node in access structure is the only designated.
Let the access tree's root be r, x T represents the sub-tree of the root x, then T and r T are the same. If the attribute set meets the access tree, it can be indicated by
T γ is calculated as follows:
1) if x is a non-leaf node, all child nodes '
2) if and only if at least x k children nodes of ' ( )
3) if x is a leaf node, then ( ) 
Our construction 4.1. Construction definition
We consider the following application scenario ( Fig. 1) : Company A pays a CSP for sharing corporate data in cloud servers. We assume that the system is composed of the following parties: the CSP, the Trusted Third Party (TTP), enterprise users, end user and DepartMent (DM). the CSP operates a large number of interconnected cloud servers with abundant storage capacity and computational power to provide high quality services; the TTP is responsible for generating the initial parameter; company A that pays for sharing corporate data in cloud servers is an enterprise user; all personnel in the company who share data in cloud servers are end users; the department is responsible for generating keys for the end users; we use Fig. 2 as an example to illustrate these parties. On the other hand, for any node x in the tree T , let x S be the set of all nodes on the path from node x to the root node r , and x f be the product of all node Lagrange coefficients , ' 
Scheme construction
Based on the algorithm proposed in this paper, this section gives an integration of the key establishment, distribution and encryption of the signature for the cloud network, which consists of three parts.
The initialization process
First, the TTP uses a Setup function to calculate and output the public parameters: 
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The Id, K and the assigned to the attributes of the node have been written into the end users, then each user has its own attributes, identity keys, and related public parameters. .
The signature and encryption process
The TTP randomly chooses 
The consistency of encryption and decryption is the same with IBE, according to the following formula:
. In addition, before the construction of actual private cloud networks, the master key in the initialization process is generally generated and managed by the TTP, and the attribute key needs to be generated in the private cloud networks communication for a specific access to the tree. To secure the delivery of the attribute keys, the TTP should encrypt the attribute key in practical applications. Shamir's IBE algorithm decryption is used to encrypt the attribute key in this scheme.
A new client in the private cloud network needs to be initialized by the management system, such as TTP, to obtain the corresponding identity attributes. Similarly, if the client leaves, the management system needs to recover their occupied resources, such as the IP address and the corresponding attributes. , , q G G e ) can successfully attack the encryption signature scheme, then prove that C can take advantage of A to solve the CDH problem.
C makes sP aP = , A selects two messages 0 m and 1 m , the sender Id A , the receiver Id B who will be attacked and the receiver's attributes, and requests C to encrypt and sign the message. C makes (0) 
In other words, C calculates abP successfully. C solves the CDH problem.
Other safety analysis
Non-repudiation: If there are signatures 〈j, v〉 generated by A 's private key A K and an arbitrary random integer l , due to these two variables known just by A , then the encrypted signer A cannot deny their behavior. However, for the recipient, as long as his attribute set ' γ meets ( ') 1, T = γ then with the assistance of the PKG to decrypt the ciphertext, the decipher B can deny their behavior.
Resistance collusion: After the TTP receives ( , , ',Id , ),
T Q γ γ μ first it checks the correspondence of the nodes Id B and ', γ if the attributes in ' g belong to node B , then with the application of the Key Generation function calculate the node attribute key D ; if the attributes are from different nodes, then it will not send an attribute key D to any node.
Performance analysis
Considering a thin client with low computing power, small memory and other features, choose the Lagrange polynomial for each node of the tree. Lagrange coefficient calculation and attribute-key encryption are not in the client (these calculations are completed by the TTP). In the attribute key generation process, the clients only need to complete less computing. Table 1 gives the computational cost comparison of the main algorithms in IBBSC scheme [5] , PFIBE scheme [16] and our scheme. In Table I , L is the number of attributes associated with a user, I is the maximum depth of DMs administering attributes associated with a user, N is the number of conjunctive clauses in an access structure, T is the maximum depth of DMs administering attributes in the access control, n is the number of recipients. d is the number of attributes in the set ' γ which meets ( ') 1.
T = γ
It can be seen from Table 1 that IBBSC [5] uses a bilinear operation in the encryption process which causes the greatest delay. Therefore, its computational efficiency is relatively low. PFIBE [16] uses only one time the complex bilinear operation in the decryption process, but its computation is related to the network scale, when the network size is larger, more multiplication and exponentiation computations make the cost rapidly increasing. Our scheme is much more efficient than the other two methods, being independent from the network size and fit for private cloud networks.
Experimental analysis
The experimental equipment consists of 1.73 GHz Inter(R) Core(TM), 2 GB DDR2 and Windows Server 2003. The experimental environment is constructed by Red Hat Enterprise 5 in the VMware Workstation 6.5.1 virtual machine, and distributed to 1GB RAM. Our experiments just consider a different length of the master keys, and ignore the transmission delay of data in the distributed network. The longer the sign-encryption master key is, the higher the security is. However, at the same time it will cause the corresponding sign-encryption time to become longer. For different numbers of attributes and key lengths, the computing time of the proposed algorithm and IBBSC [5] is compared in Figs 3 and 4 , where d is the number of attributes, t is the number of clients, the running time is the average of the amount 10 times. From Figs 3 and 4 we can figure out that both the encryption and decryption time cost in our scheme is less than in IBBSC method, and as the length of the master key increases, our scheme is more efficient. Also, while the number of attributes d and clients t increases, the efficiency of our method is more obvious. This improvement is meaningful since the algorithm running time has a direct impact on the real-time encryption system.
Remark: This paper does not use the standard arithmetic library, it has not been optimized to reach the standards of the commercial library, so if using the commercial library, the average of the algorithm running time can be shortened. On the other hand, the choice of the prime number has also an important impact on the performance of the algorithm.
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a cryptographic access control solution based on CP-ABE and IBS schemes in cloud computing, so that to simultaneously achieve: (1) low manage complexity; (2) fine-grained access control; (3) thin client adaptability; (4) data unforgeability. We proved the scheme, which is also collusion resistant, to be semantically secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attacks under the random oracle model.
In future work we will design expressive and scalable user revocation schemes for cloud servers under the random oracle model or the standard model.
